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Abstract
Humans are exposed to viruses everywhere they live, play, and work. Yet people’s beliefs about 
viruses may be confused or inaccurate, potentially impairing their understanding of scientific 
information. This study used semi-structured interviews to examine people’s beliefs about vi-
ruses, vaccines, and the causes of infectious disease. We compared people at different levels of 
science expertise: middle school students, teachers, and professional virologists. The virologists 
described more entities involved in microbiological processes, how these entities behaved, and 
why. Quantitative and qualitative analyses revealed distinctions in the cognitive organization of 
several concepts, including infection and vaccination. For example, some students and teachers 
described viral replication in terms of cell division, independent of a host. Interestingly, most stu-
dents held a mental model for vaccination in which the vaccine directly attacks a virus that is 
present in the body. Our findings have immediate implications for how to communicate about 
infectious disease to young people.
Keywords: expertise, infectious disease, mental models, public understanding of science and 
health, vaccines, viruses
1. Introduction
Viral diseases create health concerns around the globe. For example, influenza epidemics 
cause 3–5 million cases of severe illness and an estimated half million deaths worldwide each 
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year (Stohr, 2002; World Health Organization, 2009). In the United States alone, estimates in-
dicate that more than a million people are infected with HIV, with one in five unaware of their 
condition (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2008; UNAIDS, 2010). Genital human 
papillomavirus (HPV) infection, now the most common sexually transmitted disease in the 
United States, has an overall prevalence rate of over 25% in both men and women, with an es-
timated 6 million individuals newly infected every year (Dunne et al., 2006, 2007). Such viruses 
place an enormous burden on productivity and healthcare (Gasparini et al., 2012; Marchisio et 
al., 2012), and an immeasurable toll on those whose lives are directly affected.
A crucial development in managing viral disease has been the development and widespread 
avail ability of vaccines (Oldstone, 1998). Yet, people’s beliefs about viruses, vaccines, and the 
causes of infectious disease can affect their acceptance of scientific information. In the U.S., a 
growing number of parents are declining the Measles, Mumps, and Rubella (MMR) vaccine for 
their children, partly in response to false claims about its link to autism (Smith et al., 2008). Un-
scientific messages about vaccines are widespread, and actively promoted. For example, a re-
cent billboard in Times Square, New York displayed a picture of a mother cradling her infant 
along with the message: “Vaccines: Know the risks” and “Vaccination. Your Health. Your Fam-
ily. Your Choice” (Platts, 2011). While scientific progress in the management of viral diseases has 
been substantial, its impact depends on achieving a scientifically informed public capable of re-
jecting such anti-science propaganda.
How can educators increase people’s understanding of viruses, vaccines, and the causes of 
infec tious disease? Simply presenting people with scientific evidence often doesn’t work, be-
cause adults and children form their own conceptualizations about the biological and physical 
world, using their observations, experiences, and background knowledge. These conceptions 
often deviate substantially from scientific models (Carey, 1985; Chi, Slotta, and de Leeuw, 
1994b; diSessa, 2006, Duschl, Schweingruber, and Shouse, 2007; Vosniadou and Brewer, 1992). 
Although most children and adults in the United States are taught biological models of illness, 
involving germs and viruses as the cause (Lakshmi and Gelman, 2004; Sigelman, 2012), belief 
formation is also influenced by cultural and developmental factors that provide moral, mysti-
cal, or common sense explanations for illness (Hejmadi, Rozin, and Siegal, 2004; Lakshmi and 
Gelman, 2004; Legare and Gelman 2008; Zhu, Liu, and Tardif, 2009). Sigelman (2012), for ex-
ample, found that U.S. children up to eighth grade pro vided cold weather explanations more 
often than germ-based explanations for the common cold.
People’s naïve beliefs about science are resistant to change and may persist even in the face 
of inconsistent evidence (Chi et al., 1994b; Chinn and Brewer, 1993; Sigelman, 2012; Stein, Her-
nandez, and Anggoro, 2010). Thus, directly confronting these beliefs and introducing a coher­
ent scientific framework is vital in early instruction (Au and Romo, 1996; Chi and Roscoe, 
2002; Chinn and Brewer, 1993; diSessa, 2006; Singer, Nielsen, and Schweingruber, 2012; Stein 
et al., 2010; Vosniadou, 1994). In the case of virology, little is known about people’s beliefs 
about the microbiology of viruses and vaccines. What do viruses do inside the body? Why do 
they make us sick? What are vaccines, and how do they work? Identifying people’s answers to 
questions such as these is an important first step toward creating instruction that will correct 
and replace naïve beliefs (Singer et al., 2012). This was the main aim of our research.
Present study
This study examined people’s microbiological­level beliefs about viruses, vaccines, and the 
causes of infectious disease in three groups with different levels of science experience: mid-
dle school students, middle or high school teachers (primarily science teachers), and expert 
virologists. Middle school students represent the group with the least experience, although 
these students do encounter scientific information about viruses in school. Teachers represent 
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an intermediate level of experience: some are engaged in explaining virology concepts to stu-
dents while others repre sent educated, but not expert, adults. The virology experts represent 
the highest level of experi ence, and their responses provide a standard against which to com-
pare the other two groups.
Our research approach was intended to identify the mental models of participants—their 
causal explanations of the microbiological activity of viruses and vaccines. In mental mod-
els research (e.g., Chi et al., 1994b; Gentner and Stevens, 1983; Vosniadou, 1994; Vosniadou 
and Brewer, 1992) interviews are typically used to elicit causal explanations from the partic-
ipant. The inter viewer asks generative questions (cf. Vosniadou, 1994), which require the par-
ticipants to explain phenomena that they cannot directly observe. Participants’ explanations 
can be used to create causal diagrams or illustrations that capture the structure and content 
of their mental models. For example, Vosniadou and Brewer (1992) identified several distinct 
mental models that children have about the shape of the Earth, including a “hollow sphere” 
model in which humans inhabit Earth’s interior, and the sky exists only above. This model is 
causal in nature, because the hypoth esized properties of the Earth provide an explanation for 
the child’s observations, such as the apparent flatness of the Earth, and the limited range of 
sky that is visible from Earth’s surface.
In the present research we conducted individual structured interviews with middle school 
students, teachers, and experts. Interviews probed participants’ beliefs about eight key topics, 
which were identified through a collaborative process involving the researchers and a virol-
ogy expert. The topics were intended to cover fundamental concepts related to the microbio-
logical activity of viruses and vaccines, including: (1) the external appearance of the virus, (2) 
the exter nal appearance of the host cell, (3) the contents of the virus, (4) the contents of the host 
cell, (5) the replicated virus, (6) the impact of the virus on the immune system, (7) the immune 
cell, and (8) vaccination.
Our analyses involved quantitative and qualitative techniques to explore the depth, 
breadth, and structure of the explanations provided by each group. Our quantitative analyses 
drew on the Structure­Behavior­Function (SBF) framework used in prior research on expert 
knowledge (e.g., Hmelo­Silver and Pfeffer, 2004; see also Chi et al., 1994a). The framework 
provides a way of capturing differences in knowledge between individuals or groups by ana-
lyzing their representa tions of a complex process or system in terms of structures (the elements 
of a system), behaviors (the activity of an element), and functions (the purpose of an element in 
a system). By applying this framework to our participants’ responses, we can more specifi-
cally identify differences in knowledge between the groups. Previous research has found that 
experts possess more knowl edge about the functions of entities in their domain of expertise 
(Hmelo­Silver and Pfeffer, 2004; Medin, Lynch, and Coley, 1997). Thus, we predicted that peo-
ple with greater expertise in virol ogy would be more likely to describe the various interview 
topics at a functional level. Our qualitative analyses aimed to visually represent participants’ 
mental models for various inter view topics in the form of causal diagrams. Using the virolo-
gist’s mental models as a standard, we aimed to identify common areas of understanding as 
well as misconceptions about the micro biology of viruses.
2. Method
Participants
Our methods and analyses aligned with Hmelo­Silver and Pfeffer (2004), who investigated 
mental models of aquaria across different levels of expertise: middle school students (n = 11), 
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pre-service teachers (n = 11), and experts (n = 8). We used their sample sizes (which are typi-
cal for mental models research; Singer et al., 2012) as a guideline for our own. Our participants 
were 13 ninth grade students and 18 teachers from an urban school district in Nebraska, and 
7 domain experts in virology. All were paid for their participation. Half of the teachers taught 
at the middle school level and half taught at the high school level. The majority of the teach-
ers (13 of 18) taught science as their primary subject. Each of the virology experts possessed 
an advanced graduate or medical degree and over 10 years of experience working in virology. 
Participants were selected on the basis of their participation in a two-week immersive pro-
gram, the Omaha Science Media Project ( http://www.worldofviruses.unl.edu/osmp.shtml ), 
in which students and teachers created videos and radio programs while spending time in vi-
rology research laboratories.
Materials
An interview protocol guided the interviewer to cover the eight main topic areas listed above. 
The protocol contained prompts to encourage the participant to discuss these topics and to 
probe the participant’s responses more deeply for structural, behavioral, and functional be-
liefs. For example, the section of the interview about the external appearance of the virus was 
initiated by asking the participant to describe what a virus looks like. If the participant stated 
that a virus has “parts on the outside,” then they would be asked to describe what the parts 
look like, what they do, and what purpose they serve. Prompts for each of the eight key top-
ics are listed in the Online Appendix. The protocol also helped to ensure that participants dis-
cussed the topics in roughly the same order and at a comparable level of detail, while at the 
same time providing enough flexibility to allow us to capture variations in participants’ men-
tal models.
The interviews were recorded using a digital video camera with a microphone. The student 
interviews were conducted in a quiet room during their participation in the Omaha Science 
Media Project. The teachers were interviewed before the program in a convenient location, 
such as their home or office. Experts were interviewed in their office or lab.
Procedure
A trained experimenter interviewed each participant individually. The participant was seated 
across from the interviewer, and the camera was focused on the participant. At the onset of 
the interview, the participant was told: “This conversation is for me to find out what you think 
about viruses. This isn’t about whether your ideas are right or wrong—many of the questions 
that I’ll ask don’t have a right or wrong answer. I’m just interested in your ideas. Even if you 
feel you are uncertain, I’d like to hear what’s on your mind. I might ask you to expand on 
some of your answers, just so that I have a clearer idea about what you are saying.” The in-
terviewer never pro vided feedback about the accuracy of the participant’s responses; how-
ever, the interviewer was instructed to elicit a high level of detail from the participant, and 
to use prompts when necessary. Each interview began with the same question: what is a vi-
rus? The interviews then proceeded on to each of the eight key topics in the order specified 
above, using the prompts shown in the Online Appendix when needed. When the participant 
responded to all of the experimenter’s follow up questions about a topic, or stated that he/she 
had provided as much detail as they could, a new topic was introduced. There was no stan-
dard way to transition to a new interview topic. If a topic had already been mentioned, the in-
terviewer might say: “Let’s bring back the topic of…” If a topic had not been mentioned, they 
might say: “Let’s move on to the topic of…” Each interview lasted from 60 to 90 minutes. 
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Data Coding
Audio from each interview was transcribed and coded using a system created and refined by 
two primary researchers and a virologist. The coding captured each participant’s discussion 
of the eight key topics identified above. To explore expertise­related differences in the depth 
of their explana tions, we coded participants’ responses for the presence of structural, behav-
ioral, and functional descriptions (cf. Hmelo­Silver and Pfeffer, 2004). For example, if a par-
ticipant mentioned the specific contents of the virus (e.g., “chemicals, proteins, and germs,” 
or “nucleic acid, DNA, and RNA”), then this response was coded as giving a structural de-
scription of this topic. If participants described how the contents acted (e.g., “DNA splits,” or 
“DNA uses the enzymes of the host cell”), then we coded their responses as providing a behav-
ioral description. These responses were consid ered behavioral because they describe the mech-
anism through which a function, i.e., virus replica tion, is accomplished. Finally, if participants 
described the purpose or role of a behavior or structure (e.g., “splitting allows the virus to re-
produce,” or “the virus DNA uses the host DNA to replicate”), then their utterance was coded 
as a functional description.
Two independent research assistants scored each interview for the presence or absence of 
struc tures, behaviors, and functions with high reliability (Cohen’s Kappa = .88). Disagree-
ments between the coders were resolved through discussions involving one of the primary 
researchers.
Our qualitative analyses involved identifying the causal claims that participants made 
about each topic. We created causal schematic diagrams to display the various entities—such as 
the virus and host cell—and parts—such as the virus DNA/RNA and the host cell receptors—
that partici pants discussed. The entities and parts are connected in the diagrams through the 
relations that the participants stated, including causal, spatial, and featural relations. The re-
sulting causal diagrams can be taken as a representation of a specific mental model for a topic.
3. Results
Quantitative analyses
To explore expertise-related differences in explanatory depth, we computed the mean num-
ber of structures, behaviors, and functions discussed by each group across the eight key topics 
from the coding system. These means are shown in Table 1. It is important to note that we did 
not consider the scientific accuracy of the descriptions for this analysis, only the type of state-
ment that was made. (The structure and accuracy of participants’ explanations is discussed in 
greater detail in the qualitative analyses section.)
Table 1. Mean number of structures, behaviors, and functions in each group’s descriptions of the eight 
key topics.
Group N Structures Behaviors Functions Total
Students 13 2.69 (1.18) 2.92 (1.12) 1.92 (1.19) 2.51 (0.52)
Teachers 18 3.56 (1.15) 3.22 (1.44) 3.33 (1.50) 3.37 (0.17)
Experts  7 5.86 (0.69) 5.57 (1.71) 4.43 (1.41) 5.29 (0.76)
Total 38 3.68 (1.54) 3.55 (1.61) 3.05 (1.59) 
Standard deviations in parentheses. Means are out of 8.0. Means for totals are weighted by the 
number of partici pants in each group. 
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A 3 (Group: student, teacher, expert) × 3 (Level of Description: structure, behavior, func­
tion) mixed factorial ANOVA was conducted. The analysis revealed a significant effect of 
Group, F(2, 35) = 17.29, p < .05, ηp
2 = .50. Post hoc tests using Tukey’s HSD found that, across 
Level of Description, experts discussed more key topics (M = 5.29, SD = 0.76) than teachers 
(M = 3.37, SD = 0.17) and students (M = 2.51, SD = 0.52) (ps < .05). There was not a signifi-
cant difference between the teachers and students. This result indicates that participants with 
greater expertise mentioned more of the relevant topics. There was also a significant main ef-
fect of Level of Description, F(2, 35) = 7.43, p < .05, ηp
2 = .18. A linear contrast analysis found 
that, overall, participants described structures most often (M = 3.68, SD = 1.54), followed by 
behav iors (M = 3.55, SD = 1.61), and functions (M = 3.05, SD = 1.59), F(1, 35) = 9.41, p < .05, ηp
2 
= .21. Thus, when participants discussed the structure of some entity or part, they described 
its behavior more often than its function. The Group × Level of Description interaction was 
only marginally significant, F(2, 35) = 2.34, p < .10, ηp
2 = .12, likely due to the relatively low 
power (.65) for detecting this particular effect. We predicted that the groups with more expe-
rience would provide a greater number of functional descriptions. While the number of func-
tional descriptions did increase with the group’s level of experience, Table 1 shows that this 
pattern appeared at the structural and behavioral levels as well. Thus, the marginal Group × 
Level of Description interaction is more likely due to differences in the number of structural, 
behavioral, and functional descriptions within each group. As Table 1 shows, both the student 
and expert groups provided relatively fewer descriptions at the deeper levels (behavioral and 
functional), whereas teachers discussed structure, behaviors, and functions about equally of-
ten. Importantly, these findings are not attributable to differences in the length of the inter-
views between groups. There was no significant difference in the average number of words 
per interview between stu dents (M = 6806, SD = 1521), teachers (M = 6313, SD = 545), and ex-
perts (M = 7118, SD = 1297), F(2, 35) = 1.58, p = .22, ηp
2 = .08.
It is also interesting to examine the explanatory levels of description for each topic sepa-
rately to identify specific topics that were discussed in greater depth by each group. Table 2 
shows the pro portion of students, teachers, and experts who discussed each key topic at the 
structural, behav ioral, and functional levels. The bolded regions indicate a topic that over a 
third of the participants in a group discussed at a given level. Prior researchers have used this 
criterion to establish group­level models of understanding (e.g., Lynch and Medin, 2006). Us-
ing this criterion leads to several new insights. For example, Table 2 indicates that the students 
discussed certain topics (the virus contents, the immune cell, and vaccines) more often than 
other topics, suggesting that these topics are more central to the students’ understanding. The 
teachers tended to discuss the same topics as the students; however, the teachers discussed 
functions for each topic, whereas students tended to discuss function only for vaccines. This 
result indicates greater depth in the teachers’ explanations. In addition, the teachers discussed 
the topic of the replicated virus, especially its behavior and function, suggesting that teach-
ers provided more complete explanations of the replication process. In contrast to students 
and teachers, the experts described almost every topic at multiple levels and often covered all 
three levels. The virologists’ explanations were thus broader, deeper, and more coherent than 
the other groups’ explanations.
In addition to showing the topics that participants discussed, Table 2 also shows that 
partici pants, regardless of their expertise, seldom described the external appearance of the 
host cell and its contents. This finding may be attributable to how viral infection and repli-
cation were discussed. Participants generally described the virus and the contents of the vi-
rus as active agents, and placed the host in the passive role. Descriptions of virus–host inter-
actions were therefore likely to empha size the behavior and function of the virus rather than 
the host. 
Me n ta l  M o d e l s  o f  v i ru s e s , vac c i n e s , a n d t h e  c au s e s  o f  i n f e c t i o u s  d i s e a s e     7
Qualitative analyses
These analyses focus on the topics that all three groups discussed at multiple levels of detail: 
the virus contents, the immune cell, and vaccines. Although the groups tended to discuss each 
of these topics in depth, this does not imply that they provided qualitatively similar descrip-
tions; in fact there were substantial differences in their explanations. To capture these qualita-
tive differences, one of the primary investigators examined the interview transcripts to iden-
tify different types of explanations for each topic. Of primary interest were the different causal 
mechanisms that partici pants mentioned in their explanations of virus replication, immune 
response, and vaccination. These differences represent fundamental differences in the men-
tal models around which these top ics are organized cognitively. When a causal description 
was common to at least three participants, it was represented as a diagram. Following conven-
tions within the psychological literature (e.g., Glymour, 2001), entities in the causal diagrams 
were represented as boxes, and relations were represented as directed arrows (note that dif-
ferent kinds of relations are represented, including causal and spatial relations). Figure 1 pro-
vides examples. The diagrams represent an attempt to capture the common structure of differ-
ent explanations; some details and variations in wording were removed in the process. Two 
independent coders used the causal diagrams to classify the participants’ responses for each of 
three topics (if the participant in fact discussed the topics). The coders were instructed to iden-
tify the causal diagram that best fit the participant’s explanation. Coders also could respond 
that there was no good fit. The coders classified the causal explanations with high reliability 
(Cohen’s Kappa = .89). Disagreements between the coders were resolved through discussion.
Contents of the virus. Table 2 shows that participants in each group frequently provided struc-
tural descriptions of the contents of the virus. Each expert mentioned nucleic acid (or DNA 
and RNA, specifically) in his or her structural description of the contents of the virus. Most 
teachers (11 of 18) mentioned either DNA or RNA in their structural descriptions; however, 
several teachers described the virus contents as “protein,” “pure sickness,” “cellular parts,” 
or “poison.” In comparison, 6 of 13 students mentioned either DNA or RNA, and several de-
scribed the contents of the virus as “cells,” “a nucleus,” “bacteria,” “chemicals,” or “harmful 
stuff.” Thus, although a high proportion of the teachers and students gave structural descrip-
tions, only 46% of the students and 61% of the teachers incorporated the concepts of DNA or 
RNA in their mental model, as all experts did. 
Table 2. Proportion of participants who discussed the key topics at each level of description.
Interview topic                           Students                                Teachers                            Experts
  S B F S B F S B F
1. Virus appearance .23 .15 .08 .39 .28 .28 1.00 .57 .57
2. Host appearance .15 .08 .08 .17 .00 .00 .43 .29 .00
3. Virus contents .85 .38 .31 .83 .72 .67 1.00 1.00 1.00
4. Host contents .46 .08 .00 .61 .22 .17 1.00 .29 .14
5. Replicated virus .00 .31 .00 .06 .56 .44 .57 .86 .43
6. Virus/immune system .00 .62 .31 .00 .22 .39 .00 .86 .43
7. Immune cell .54 .46 .23 .50 .29 .44 .86 .71 .86
8. Vaccine .46 .85 .92 1.00 .83 .94 1.00 1.00 1.00
S, B, and F stand for the structural, behavioral, and functional levels of description respectively. Bolded num-
bers indicate a proportion greater than 33%.
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Table 2 also shows that the frequency of behavioral and functional descriptions for this 
topic increased with experience level. The experts’ behavioral descriptions focused on interac-
tions between the contents of the virus and the host cell, e.g., “the nucleic acid of the virus in-
corporates itself into the nucleic acid of the human cell,” or “the virus utilizes the host cell’s 
enzymes.” These behavioral descriptions related primarily to the function of replication: “to 
make more viruses,” or “to replicate nucleic acid,” etc. For example, one expert said:
A virus has RNA on the inside and some have DNA … When [the virus nucleic acid] gets 
into the cell it incorporates itself into the nucleic acid of the human cell. So it’s using the hu-
man cell and it’s using its code to tell that cell to make [the virus] coat, outer protein and ev-
erything else.
A causal diagram representing this typical expert explanation is presented in Figure 1a, the 
“virus uses host nucleic acid” model.
Six of the 18 teachers provided causal explanations that were similar to the experts’. Exam-
ples of teachers’ explanations are, “viruses reproduce by exchanging a part of their RNA with 
the host organism’s,” and “[the virus] takes over the machinery of the host cell to make more 
Figure 1. Mental models of virus replication. 
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copies of itself.” These responses fit the “virus uses host nucleic acid” model. However, three 
teachers described an alternative mechanism for replication—e.g., “DNA splits to reproduce 
virus,” “it starts dividing and multiplying,” or “virus reproduces like molecular replication.” 
For example, one teacher stated:
Viruses reproduce by splitting … the [virus’] DNA lines up, splits and so there’s two what 
they call daughter cells and they’re identical cells. So that’s how they reproduce. They just 
kind of make clones of themselves and copies.
This type of response is represented in Figure 1b, the “virus cell division” model. This men-
tal model was also held by 6 of the 13 students, making it the most common model within the 
student group.
Five teachers described the behavior of the virus broadly, without specifying the mecha-
nism through which the virus replicates. Although generally consistent with the “virus uses 
host nucleic acid” model, these responses lacked important structural and behavioral details. 
Four of the 13 students provided similar explanations. A response of this kind is represented 
in the following student statement, shown in Figure 1c:
Viruses contain DNA … Viruses reproduce when they switch off DNA with the [host] cell … 
it takes the DNA from it and makes another body with it. And then it keeps doing that. The vi-
rus takes the DNA … and makes a whole new body.
Immune cells. Participants in the three groups expressed similar ideas about the structure, 
behavior, and function of immune cells. Participants at each experience level mentioned “T 
cells,” “white blood cells,” “antibodies,” and “antigens.” Only the virologists mentioned “B 
cells,” “macrophages,” and “natural killer cells.” Thus, the experts’ mental models were more 
conceptually complex. The following excerpt is from one expert’s description of the immune 
cells:
Typically the body reacts by trying to generate antibodies specific to the virus and also gener-
ate T cells to attack the cells that are infected with the virus … to try to eradicate virus and vi-
rus infected cells … T cells and macrophages go to the site of infection to try to mop up the 
infection.
Teachers and students provided similar descriptions but posed them in more general terms. 
Their descriptions often lacked the distinctions between the behavior and function of the dif-
ferent types of immune cells described by the experts. For example:
The white cells identify [the virus], then destroy it… (Teacher)
It goes to the target [i.e., virus] cell and … [the immune cell] comes and like feels it and it’s like, 
“oh, that’s foreign,” and it tries to kill it. (Student)
Vaccines. Table 2 shows that vaccines were the topic described in the most detail across the 
three groups. Unlike most of the other topics, vaccines were described by participants most of-
ten at the functional level, focusing on the role of the vaccine inside the body. The experts and 
teachers described vaccines similarly across the three levels of description. Consider the fol-
lowing excerpts: 
10   J e e  e t  a l . i n  Pu b l i c  un d e r s ta n d i n g  o f  sc i e n c e  (2013)
A vaccine is really an artificial means of stimulating the immune system to protect you against 
some infectious agent … You find out what part of the viral particle could be part of the vir-
ulence factor of the virus and you try to find a way to stimulate the immune system to knock 
that out. (Expert)
A vaccine … is a small amount of the virus that they are putting into your body to hope that 
your body will take that and make antibodies, if I’m thinking correctly, against that disease. 
So that if you come in contact with [the virus] you will not get it. (Teacher)
The structure of the vaccine was described variously as “a replica of the virus” (Expert), 
“a viral particle that could be part of the virulence factor of the virus” (Expert), “a diluted 
type of virus” (Teacher), or “a weaker form of the virus” (Teacher). In describing the behav-
ior of the vaccine, each expert mentioned either the immune system or antibodies, e.g., “the 
vaccine stimulates the immune system.” Many of the teachers mentioned this same behav-
ior, but in more general terms, such as “teaches your body to fight the virus,” or “gives your 
body a preview of the virus.” At the functional level, both the virologists and teachers men-
tioned preparation to fight or prevent future infection, e.g., “you will have antibodies specific 
to clear up the virus” (Expert), or “a vaccine helps your body to recognize the virus and help 
fight it” (Teacher). Overall, the experts and teach ers held the “vaccine stimulates immune sys-
tem” model in Figure 2a.
The students’ functional descriptions of vaccines were similar to the teachers’ and experts’; 
for example, “prevents body from getting virus,” or “helps fight off that virus before it gets 
to your system.” Students’ structural and behavioral descriptions, however, revealed two dif-
ferent mental models for how vaccines carry out this function. Four students described vac-
cines simi larly to the experts and teachers (the “vaccine stimulates immune system” model). 
However, 7 of the 13 students described a vaccine as an antivirus, which works by “attacking 
the virus in the body,” or “creating a barrier from the virus.” This belief was also reflected in 
these students’ structural descriptions, which included “a chemical, anti­version of the virus,” 
or “liquid, anti bodies.” Thus, many students thought that vaccines fought infections directly, 
rather than pre paring the immune system to fight infection. The following excerpt from a stu-
dent interview captures this belief:
A vaccine … is like an anti­version of the virus … a vaccine works the same way viruses attack 
our cells … I think the chemicals or whatever they inject has cells to it … and those are more 
powerful than the virus itself and it attacks the virus in the body. (Student)
This “antivirus” mental model is represented in Figure 2b.
Topics discussed exclusively by the experts. Table 2 reveals that the experts more often dis-
cussed the external appearance of the virus and the host cell than the other two groups did. 
These topics were mentioned in the context of explanations of how the virus attaches itself to 
the host cell. Most of the experts mentioned that many viruses have a “protein coat,” “attach-
ment proteins,” or “lipid coat,” which can attach to a specific host cell’s receptors. As one ex-
pert put it:
The reason [the virus and host] are linked is that over long periods of time the virus has 
evolved into a cellular protein or a series of cellular proteins, as the door. And it would be 
senseless to use something like the door to walk into a room where there’s not a party going 
on. And so the virus has learned to go only into the rooms with the party… 
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The experts mentioned several different mechanisms of attachment and entry, including 
punc turing, penetrating, or fusing to the host cell. Each group’s interview responses were 
coded for the presence of descriptions of attachment. All seven experts mentioned attach-
ment, compared to 11 of 18 teachers and 3 of 13 students. The experts’ frequent description of 
attachment indicates a greater level of coherence between their mental models of the various 
stages of infection. As the above quote illustrates, the experts were also sensitive to the fact 
that virus attachment is specific to the properties of the host cell. Thus, only certain cells can 
become infected.
4. Discussion
Our main goal was to examine people’s mental models of viruses, vaccines, and infectious dis-
ease at different levels of expertise. An analysis of student, teacher, and expert explanations 
of these topics yielded several main findings. As expected, the experts discussed more topics 
than either the students or teachers did. The experts also provided more descriptions across 
each level of detail—structural, behavioral, and functional. Our finding differs from Hmelo­
Silver and Pfeffer (2004), who discovered expertise­related differences in functional knowl-
edge only. This discrepancy is perhaps because the domain that we investigated involves more 
invisible entities than the domain that Hmelo­Silver and Pfeffer (2004) investigated (aquaria). 
Novices may have little structural knowledge of viruses, vaccines, and other such entities, be-
cause these structures cannot be observed with the naked eye. All three groups provided rel-
atively rich descriptions of the contents of viruses (and how viruses replicate), immune cells, 
and vaccines. Teachers’ and students’ explanations of these topics often aligned with the ex-
perts’ explanations, but were less detailed. In some cases, however, the teachers and students 
had entirely different mental models. Strikingly, many students described virus replication in 
terms of cell division rather than as a result of the interaction with the host. Furthermore, stu-
dents described vaccines as a sort of antivirus or virus-killing antibiotic, with vaccination act-
ing to treat a preexisting infection.
Understanding that biological entities are involved in illness—as opposed to environmen-
tal fac tors such as cold weather, or psychological factors such as morality—is a crucial step to-
Figure 2. Mental models of vaccines. 
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ward scientific proficiency. Yet, a sophisticated understanding of these topics requires under-
standing the microbiological activity of viruses and vaccines. Our research finds that students, 
and even a few teachers, held misconceptions about these topics. Many students explained vi-
rus replication as cell division, omitting key entities, such as the host cell, and processes, such 
as the virus attaching to the host cell receptors. The “antivirus” mental model of vaccines was 
also common among stu dents. Again, key entities and processes were missing—this model 
does not include the immune system and its response to the vaccine. Thinking of vaccines as a 
treatment for infection may also lead a person to misunderstand the long­term and beneficial 
effects of vaccination.
If people have inaccurate mental models of viruses and vaccines, then simply present-
ing them with correct scientific information may be ineffective. This approach is unlikely 
to lead people to abandon their naïve models (Au and Romo, 1996; Chi et al., 1994b; Chinn 
and Brewer, 1993; Singer et al., 2012; Vosniadou, 2002). For example, telling a student that 
a virus needs a host to survive may not change their belief that viruses reproduce through 
cell division. The student could interpret the statement by thinking that the virus consumes 
the host cell, perhaps using it as fuel in its reproductive process. Likewise, a student could 
interpret the information that vaccination has an effect on the immune system within the 
antivirus mental model. For instance, the student may incorporate the new information by 
thinking that the virus hides in the immune system, so the vac cine must target the immune 
system to rid it of infection.
Educational interventions benefit by directly addressing people’s preexisting concepts and 
beliefs, and by attempting to replace or refine them to support a deeper understanding (Au et 
al., 2008; diSessa, 2006; Singer et al., 2012). An overarching goal of our project was to contrib-
ute to this educational approach. Au and Romo (1996) provide an example of how children’s 
misconcep tion that HIV is a non­biological entity can be confronted and corrected. The re-
searchers attempted to replace this misconception with a causally coherent biological frame-
work for AIDS infection. The research involved a lesson that described the AIDS virus as a liv-
ing thing that can only infect a person and make them sick when it is alive. Children in their 
experimental condition were taught that the AIDS virus reproduces quickly in the blood of a 
person, stays alive but reproduces slowly in saliva, and dies quickly in water or air. Compared 
to children who received more standard instruction, those who learned the causally coherent 
biological framework showed better compre hension of the mechanisms underlying infection 
and better ability to reason about AIDS transmission.
One reason why it is difficult to understand viruses and vaccines is because their struc-
tures and behaviors are invisible to the naked eye. A potentially powerful way to introduce 
a scientific frame work in such cases is through analogy (Gentner, 1989; Jee et al., 2010; Mark-
man and Gentner, 2000; Vosniadou and Schommer, 1988). Vosniadou and Schommer (1988), 
for example, found that young children (around ages 6 and 8) had better retention and under-
standing of an expository text about the immune system’s response to infection when the pro-
cess was described using an analogy (“An infection is like a war”). Analogies could also help 
to explain particular aspects of the infec tion process that few non-experts may know about, 
such as the attachment of the virus to the host cell. For example, an expert from the present 
study explained attachment by comparing it to open ing a door to a room: the virus evolved to 
“go only into the rooms with the party.” Analogies are not only useful for getting learning off 
the ground. In fact, people with extensive expertise often use within­domain analogies to ex-
plain and reason about new discoveries in their field (Dunbar, 1997). For people with an un-
derstanding of infection, an analogy between infection and vaccina tion may address incorrect 
mental models like the “antivirus” model of vaccination. Knowledge of how infection stimu-
lates the immune system to produce antibodies could be used to better under stand how vacci-
nation guards against future illness. An important caveat with analogical instruction is that all 
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analogies break down at some point. To reap maximum benefit from an analogy, instruc tors 
could point out its limitations and provide supplemental instruction (Jee et al., 2010).
Educational interventions must also be sensitive to the underlying ontologies that shape 
peo ple’s concepts and beliefs about biology. Research on conceptual development finds that 
children draw on their knowledge of humans to reason about other biological entities, often 
explaining behavior in terms of intentionality (Carey, 1985; Hatano and Inagaki, 1997; Kele-
men, 1999). We find evidence of intention­based thinking in our study; for example, one stu-
dent stated that an immune cell “feels [the virus] and it’s like, ‘oh, that’s foreign,’ and it tries to 
kill it.” Intention­based explanations often precede, and may provide a foundation for, the ac-
quisition of mechanistic causal understanding (Hatano and Inagaki, 1997; Kelemen, 1999), but 
people may never reach this level of understanding, and, even if they do, they may revert back 
to intention­based anthropomor phic reasoning later in life (Bangerter, 2000; Epley, Waytz, and 
Cacioppo, 2007; Green and Clémence, 2008; Kelemen and Rosset, 2009). Slotta and Chi (2006) 
found that directly confront ing students’ ontological frameworks helps them to understand 
difficult topics in science. This relates to our earlier point about analogy. Although intention­
based explanations may provide a useful device for novice learners, instructors must explain 
the limits of these explanations, and provide instruction about the true causal mechanisms.
In addition to situating viruses within a biological framework, supporting learning using 
analo gies, and confronting students’ ontological misconceptions, instruction could connect 
different lev els of description: structures, behaviors, and functions. The experts in the present 
study demonstrated an understanding of these connections for a range of topics; the teachers 
for fewer topics; but the students rarely described the topics at the functional level, and when 
they did, they were often inac curate. The connection between structure, behavior, and func-
tion may be especially critical to understanding why different viruses (e.g., HIV, HPV, influ-
enza virus, etc.) affect the body in dif ferent ways. The relation between a virus and its host, 
and the process of attachment, are crucial to this understanding. For example, all of the experts 
discussed the lock-and-key relationship between virus and host, but the teachers and students 
did so much less frequently. Future educational inter ventions should take into account such 
gaps in people’s knowledge and their consequences for understanding related topics.
There are several important limitations of our study. Our sample was mainly one of conve-
nience. Thus, the extent to which our findings are representative of middle school students 
and teachers in general is unclear, and this is an important issue to be addressed in future re-
search. Likewise, it would be interesting to include populations that were not part of the pres-
ent study, such as, adults who are not teachers (i.e., average laypersons). How do their men-
tal models com pare to students’ and teachers’? We are also aware of the inherent limitations of 
our interview method. By requiring participants to articulate their beliefs, we are unable to as-
sess knowledge that may be implicitly stored (Roediger, 1990). Recent research finds that even 
when people state sci entifically accepted views, they may still hold naïve theories that exert an 
influence on their behav ior and thought (Kelemen and Rosset, 2009; Shtulman and Valcarcel, 
2012). Thus, future research should assess mental models through multiple measures, includ-
ing implicit measures.
5. Conclusion
Our study revealed several ways in which beliefs about the nature of viruses, infectious dis-
ease, and vaccines differ between people with different levels of scientific experience. The re-
sults indi cate that non­experts may hold complex, but scientifically incorrect, mental models 
of how viruses reproduce, cause disease, etc. Our interest in this topic arose from the observa-
tion that people’s beliefs about viruses, vaccines, and the causes of infectious disease can have 
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an important influ ence on their ability to understand and retain scientific information (Au and 
Romo, 1996; Chinn and Brewer, 1993; Vosniadou, 1994). Understanding these mental mod-
els provides a crucial first step toward being able to confront and correct misconceptions that 
hamper progress toward a sci entifically literate public.
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